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Abstract 
The aim of the study is to identify the level and diversity of labour taxation, 
expressed by the so-called tax wedge, in Poland compared to the other OECD 
countries. The identification is based on an analysis of statistical data collected 
in the OECD database for the years 2000-2012. The study interprets key terms 
such as labour taxation, tax wedge, and non-wage costs of labour. The further 
section synthetically discusses theoretical findings and the results of empirical 
research concerning effects of labour taxation on the functioning of the labour 
market and, in particular, its impact on employment and unemployment. The 
author’s own research includes a comparative analysis of tax wedge sizes in 
different household types in Poland and the other OECD countries in the years 
2000-2012. The major conclusion of the analysis is that labour taxation in 
Poland insufficiently takes into account the financial situation of low-earning 
individuals and those providing for children (i.e. children within households). 
The results of the conducted research form the basis for drawing synthetic 
conclusions and making recommendations for Poland. The main suggestion is 
that a selective reduction in the non-wage costs of labour of low-earning 
individuals and those burdened with family responsibilities should be considered. 
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1. Introduction 
In all developed countries labour, as one of the factors of production, is 
subject to taxation in the process of its use. The level, principles or diversity of 
taxation depend on national solutions arising from established priorities of 
national socio-economic policies. At the same time, labour taxation is one of 
those policy instruments that arouses the most controversy. Depending on the 
assumed criteria, labour taxation may simultaneously be judged to be too low or 
too high, insufficiently or excessively diversified. Such judgments are made by 
both economic theoreticians and policy practitioners, who are constantly trying 
to find an optimal level and structure of labour taxation, from the point of view 
of its social and economic functions. This study joins in the discussions by 
attempting a comparative analysis of labour taxation in Poland and countries 
forming the international Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). The principal aim of the study is to identify the level and 
diversity of the so-called tax wedge in Poland, compared to the other OECD 
countries. The identification is based on an analysis of statistical data collected 
in the OECD database for the years 2000-2012. Results of the analysis permit 
the drawing of conclusions concerning the labour taxation policy implemented 
in Poland. 
2. Labour Taxation – Comparative Analysis 
2.1. Interpretation of Key Terms 
Labour taxation consists of income taxes and social security contributions 
(paid by both the employee and employer). Income taxes are components of 
every country’s tax system, providing for mandatory payments to be paid by 
natural and legal persons to the state. As such, they perform specific functions, 
being (among others) a source of revenues for the public finance system. Income 
taxes collected from hired workers are not directly associated with the labour 
market, although they impact on the behaviours of both partners participating in 
hiring processes in that market, i.e. employers and employees. On the other 
hand, a direct relationship occurs between the functioning of the labour market 
and social security contributions (Boeri, Ours van 2011, pp. 119-129). 
Labour taxation performs functions similar to those of all other taxes, in 
particular, fiscal and regulatory functions. The fiscal function consists of providing 
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sources of revenues for state and local budgets, as well as social security funds. 
The regulatory function consists of affecting the volume of income at the 
disposal of taxpayers and their households, because labour taxation is one of the 
financial means through which income adjustment occurs. While the fiscal 
function is fulfilled by both income taxes and social security contributions, the 
regulatory function is ascribed, first and foremost, to income taxes.1 The degree 
of regulation depends on the nature of the tax nature, i.e. whether it is a fixed 
(lump-sum), linear, degressive or progressive tax, as well as whether the so-
called “negative taxation” takes place in the form of benefits compensating 
incomes deemed to be insufficient. Finally, taxation of earnings can also 
perform a stimulating function aimed at affecting the behaviours of employers 
and employees in the labour market. That is so when exemptions, allowances, 
or increased rates are used to diversify employers’ and employees’ tax burdens, 
both in the case of income taxes and social security contributions. 
Labour taxation is an important component of the non-wage costs of 
labour, strongly determining their level. It affects the relationship between gross 
earnings, being the employer’s costs, and the net earnings received by the 
employee. The share of labour taxation in the total labour costs borne by the 
employer is referred to as the “tax wedge”. The OECD Glossary of Statistical 
Terms defines the tax wedge as the “sum of personal income tax and employee 
plus employer social security contributions together with any payroll tax less 
cash transfers, expressed as a percentage of labour costs” (Glossary 2014).2 As 
suggested by the definition, the tax wedge shows not only burdens in respect of 
labour taxation but also all kinds of financial transfers received by the 
employee, such as income-dependent employee benefits aimed at providing 
financial incentives to work. 
In practice, the relationship between the employee’s gross and net 
earnings depends on the individual situation of his or her household. Therefore, 
tax wedges are calculated separately according to marital statuses (single 
individuals and married couples), number of earners (only for married couples), 
number of children provided for by the employee and the relationship between 
his or her earnings and average earnings. The results of these calculations 
indicate, in particular, the occurrence and strength of mechanisms reducing tax 
burdens of employees with low earnings and/or providing for family members. 
                                                 
1
 Social security contributions can also serve the regulatory function only in the event they are 
different for different groups of payers. 
2
 Sometimes the tax wedge also contains indirect taxes on consumption (VAT and excise tax), 
which offers complete information on the difference between gross earnings and earnings allocated to 
consumption (Nickel, Layard, 1999, pp. 3029-3083, Bukowski, 2005, p. 156, Boeri, Ours van, 
2011, pp. 121-122). 
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2.2. Results of the Research to Date 
Labour taxation – as such – increases the price of labour, causing, on one 
hand, an increase in the total costs of labour, and on the other hand, interfering 
with the market or, so to speak, the natural relationship between the cost of 
labour and its marginal productivity. This issue is the subject of many 
theoretical discussions (see, among others, Nickel, Layard 1999, pp. 3029-3083, 
Koskela 2002, pp. 63-85) and empirical studies. 
In general – according to the theoretical approach – increased labour 
costs result in decreased demand for labour. Due to the fact that those costs are  
a source of financing certain benefits which only employees are entitled to (e.g. 
related to retirement or unemployment), they may translate into an increase in 
the labour supply. That is the case, however, only in conditions assumed to be 
inherent in the functioning of labour markets under the neoclassical approach 
and, in particular, in conditions of perfect elasticity of labour supply and 
demand in relation to similarly perfectly elastic wages (Bukowski 2005, p. 158).  
In practice, such a situation does not occur in contemporary labour markets – there 
is, among others factors, the phenomenon of downward wage rigidity consequential 
to setting the minimum wage. 
Empirical research into labour taxation most commonly focuses on the 
relationship between labour taxation and volumes of employment and 
unemployment. Results of studies to date have usually led to a conclusion that high 
labour taxation adversely affects the labour market by decreasing employment and 
contributing to increased unemployment. It also results in higher employment in 
the grey area of the economy, which is directly caused by a decline in 
employees’ net earnings, encouraging them to take up unregistered employment. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that if the tax wedge is high it ought to be 
reduced in order to increase the demand for labour and, first and foremost, for 
legal employment, simultaneously decreasing socially and economically 
troublesome unemployment (Dolenc, Laporšek 2010, pp. 356-357, Dolenc, 
Vodopivec 2005, pp. 303-304, Wojciechowski 2008, p. 9). The effect is, however, 
not guaranteed because – as stems from the theory of the functioning of labour 
markets and economic practice – all those variables are influenced by many 
factors and not merely the labour taxation level. 
It should be emphasised that the research carried out in OECD countries 
indicates that the negative impact of the tax wedge on employment is the most 
severe for low-skilled individuals, most often low-earning ones, because their 
wages are less elastic than the earnings of highly-skilled employees. With 
respect to the latter, a high tax wedge may only insignificantly contribute to  
a decrease in the employment of highly-skilled individuals, whereas it causes 
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unemployment among low-skilled workers to a much larger extent. Thus, the 
macroeconomic effects of the level of labour taxation on total employment (in 
the economy as a whole) depend on the qualifications structure of labour supply: 
they are stronger in countries with a large share of low-skilled employees and 
weaker in countries where that share is small (Góra et al., 2006, p. 49). A similar 
impact of the tax wedge is observed for young employees, whose productivity of 
work and earning level are relatively low at the early stages of their careers. 
Researchers have demonstrated less interest in the diversity of tax wedge 
sizes depending on households’ individual situations. This is so despite the 
increasing recognition of the role of labour taxation in affecting the financial 
situations of households of both low- and high-earning individuals, as well as 
those more burdened or less burdened with the responsibilities associated with 
providing for children. 
2.3. Statistical Analysis 
In the years 2000-2012, the highest tax wedges in Poland occurred in 
households of single individuals earning 167% of average earnings and with no 
child: from 39.1% in 2000 to 36.2% in 2012. The lowest tax wedges occurred in 
households of single individuals earning 67% of average earnings and with two 
children (29.7% and 29.6% respectively), and in single-earner married couples 
earning 100% of average earnings and with two children (33.3% and 29.6% 
respectively) (Figure 1). 
In the study period, all tax wedges in Poland decreased by 2.9 percentage 
points (pp.) on average for all household types (from 35.8% to 32.9%). The 
largest decrease was observed for households of two-earner married couples - 
with one earning 100% of average earnings and the other 67% - and with two 
children (a decrease of 5.5 pp.), while the smallest decrease was observed in the 
group of households of single individuals earning 67% of average earnings and 
with two children (decrease of only 0.1 pp.). 
An abrupt decrease in tax wedges in Poland occurred from 2007 to 2008, 
when employees’ disability pension insurance contribution was reduced, having 
previously been 13% of the assessment basis, of which 6.5% was paid by the 
employee and 6.5% by the employer. The reduction was made in two steps: on  
1 July 2007 the part of disability pension contribution paid by the employee fell 
by 3 pp., while on 1 January 2008 the total contribution fell by 4 pp. (2 pp. for 
52                                                                Elżbieta Kryńska                                                            
employees and 2 pp. for employers).3 Following these reductions, employees 
paid the contribution accounting for 1.5% of the assessment basis, whereas 
employers paid 4.5%, making a total of 6% of the assessment basis. In 2012 tax 
wedges rose, which mainly resulted from the decision to increase, by 2 pp., the 
part of disability pension insurance contribution financed by employers.4 As  
a consequence, the disability pension insurance contribution went up from 6% 
to 8% of the assessment basis. This change was justified by the need to reduce 
the Social Insurance Fund deficit related to the disability pension fund. 
Figure 1. Tax wedges according to household types in Poland from 2000 to 2012 
Source: OECD StatExtracts, Taxing Wages, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx, accessed on 5 April 2014. 
In the years 2000-2012, changes in the sizes of average tax wedges in the 
OECD countries showed a steady downward trend for all household types. They 
decreased by 1.5 pp. on average, with most considerable decrease occurring for 
households of two-earner married couples, one earning 100% of average 
earnings and the other 33%, with two children (by 1.9 pp.), and markedly the 
least decrease for households of single individuals at 100% of average earnings, 
with no child (by 1.1 pp.) (Figure 2). 
                                                 
3
 Pursuant to the Act of 15 June 2007 on the Amendment to the Act on the Social Insurance 
System and Certain Other Acts (Journal of Laws [Dz.U.] of 2007 No. 115, item 792). 
4
 Pursuant to the Act of 21 December 2011 on the Amendment to the Act on the Social 
Insurance System (Journal of Laws [Dz.U.] of 2011 No. 291, item 1706). 
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Figure 2. Average tax wedges according to household types in 35 OECD countries from 2000 to 2012 
Source: OECD StatExtracts, Taxing Wages, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx, access on 5 April 2014. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the comparison among tax wedges 
occurring in Poland and average ones for 35 OECD countries in the study period. 
Firstly, tax wedge sizes in Poland were much less diversified according to 
household types than in OECD countries. In Poland, labour taxation of different 
household types was considerably more similar as compared to the average for 
OECD countries. The coefficient of variation computed for the values of tax 
wedges in different household types in Poland in specific years of the 2000-
2012 period ranged from 3.3 in 2005 and 2006 (the lowest value) to 8.9 in 2004 
and 2008 (the highest value), while it was 7.5 in 2012. In the same period, the 
coefficient of variation calculated for the average value of tax wedges in OECD 
countries ranged from 19.8 in 2000 (the lowest value) to 22.9 in 2009 (the highest 
value) and was 21.5 in 2012. It should be added that, in 2012, coefficients of 
labour taxation variation for different household types were lower than those in 
Poland only in Turkey (4.8) and Greece (6.4). That is direct evidence of the 
flattening of Poland’s labour taxation scale applicable to earners in households and 
indirect evidence of the non-adjustment of Poland’s tax policy, in its part concerning 
labour taxation, to the needs and capabilities of different household types. 
Both in OECD countries and Poland, the highest tax wedge occurs for 
single individuals at 167% of average earnings, with no child, i.e. those with 
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high earnings and no family responsibility burdens. That is quite obvious and 
consistent with the sense of the so called social justice. The lowest tax wedge 
(again – both in Poland and the other OECD countries) occurs for households of 
single individuals at 67% of average earnings, with two children, i.e. single 
parents, which should also be appreciated if only from the point of view of the 
pro-family policy. Interestingly, the difference between those two wedges was 
relatively small in Poland: in 2012 it was 6.5 pp., while it was as big as 23.2 pp. 
on average in OECD countries. In other words, in all countries, net incomes of 
households of working single parents with average earnings were higher than 
net incomes of working single individuals, but in some countries, Poland 
included, the differences were slight. 
The comparison of tax wedges in Poland and average tax wedges for 35 
OECD countries also leads to the other conclusion, namely that they were 
considerably higher for most Polish household types, which can be clearly seen in 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Differences between tax wedge sizes for different household types in Poland and  
35 OECD countries from 2000 to 2012 
Source: OECD StatExtracts, Taxing Wages, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx, accessed on 5 April 2014. 
In Poland, the most favourable situation occurred for single individuals 
earning 167% of average earnings, who were burdened with considerably lower 
labour taxation than their OECD counterparts. In turn, the labour taxation of 
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Polish single individuals earning 100% of average earnings and with no child 
was similar to the tax wedge level in OECD countries. In the other household 
types, labour taxation was higher than OECD countries’ average. From this 
point of view, the worst situation occurred for low-earning single parents of two 
children (single individuals earning 67% of average earnings, with two children). In 
their case, the size of the tax wedge size in Poland went from 9.9 pp. (2004) to 18.2 
pp. (2006), higher than the OECD average in the study period. 
Compared to the other OECD member states, labour taxation in Poland 
was relatively high (Table 1). In 2012, 35 countries were ranked in order from 
the lowest to the highest tax wedge size, and Poland’s labour taxation burdens 
ranked as follows: 
• single person at 67% of average earnings, no child – 18th place; 
• single person at 100% of average earnings, no child – 14th place; 
• single person at 167% of average earnings, no child – 11th place; 
• single person at 67% of average earnings, with two children – 27th place; 
• one-earner married couple at 100% of average earnings, 2 children – 20th 
place; 
• two-earner married couple, one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 
33%, 2 children – 20th place; 
• two-earner married couple, one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 
67%, 2 children – 16th place; 
• two-earner married couple, one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 
33%, no child – 17th place. 
Tax wedge sizes in OECD member states were significantly diversified. 
In 2012, for instance, net incomes of couples with one earner and two children 
were lower than gross incomes from 0.551% in New Zealand to 43.1% in France. 
Generally low labour taxation was observed in non-European countries, 
in particular countries such as: Chile, Mexico, New Zealand, Australia, Korea, 
Israel or the United States, and in Europe in Switzerland. Interestingly, in some 
countries net incomes of households of single parents with low earnings and 
two children exceeded their gross incomes, which was the case in Ireland (with  
a difference as large as 25.6%) as well as New Zealand, Canada, Australia and 
Israel. This was cause by specific benefits or tax allowances available to those 
household groups in those countries. It is worth mentioning that tax systems in 
some countries take into account taxpayers’ personal and socio-economic 
situations, which permits adjusting tax burdens to their payment capabilities in 
adopted tax solutions, considering mainly their family situations and, especially, 
the number of dependent children (see: Ślesicka 2011, pp. 58-87). Such solutions 
are applied to a very limited extent in Poland. The Polish tax system offers only 
two income tax preferences. One is the option for spouses to file a joint income 
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tax and single parents to do the same if the raised child is the second earner in 
the family. The other is a tax-deductible child allowance (since 2007).5 These 
solutions, minimalist in their nature, result in Poland’s very low ranking in all 
the quoted classifications and, in particular, in the case of labour taxation of 
single parents with low earnings and two children (27th place). 
It should be emphasised that a majority of European Union member states 
ranked low in all the classifications. That especially applied to France, Belgium 
and Sweden, i.e. countries with extensive systems of social benefits. Among EU 
member states, relatively low tax wedge sizes were characteristic of only 
countries such as Ireland, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands. Taking this into consideration, it may be said that labour taxation 
in Poland was not especially high inasmuch as its tax wedges were similar to 
those of most of the European Union member states, as has also been observed 
in other analyses (Nadolny 2009, pp. 11-14, Bartosik 2012, pp. 35-40). Poland 
stood out as a country with particularly low labour taxation of single individuals 
earning 167% of average earnings and without children. In that category its tax 
wedge was the lowest among all EU countries (ranking number one among 21 
EU member states). 
                                                 
5
 For more on this issue, see: Rękas 2012, pp. 426-429. 
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Table 1. Tax wedges for different household types in OECD countries in 2012 (in %) 
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Australia 21.489 27.208 33.029 -3.99 16.515 18.558 24.92 23.39 
Austria 44.208 48.882 51.363 27.927 37.971 37.828 41.204 45.06 
Belgium 50.461 56.048 60.957 36.885 41.375 42.592 49.005 48.832 
Canada 26.126 30.806 32.944 -7.099 18.225 23.691 26.937 27.669 
Chile 7 7 7.902 6.059 7 4.842 6.624 7 
Czech 
Republic 
39.326 42.412 44.88 14.564 20.684 29.812 34.033 40.204 
Denmark 36.999 38.554 45.069 11.687 27.845 32.471 34.151 37.197 
Estonia 39.167 40.4 41.387 26.085 32.341 34.972 36.551 39.167 
Finland 36.73 42.508 48.457 25.548 37.341 34.927 37.097 38.802 
France 47.108 50.224 54.04 38.999 43.122 41.037 45.629 46.414 
Germany 45.581 49.75 51.201 31.394 34.169 38.959 42.511 45.581 
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Greece 38.64 41.946 47.046 37.568 42.97 41.403 41.911 41.206 
Hungary 47.629 49.425 50.611 21.667 33.598 34.81 39.12 47.182 
Iceland 29.868 34.516 39.046 20.588 22.701 28.792 32.5 30.125 
Ireland 20.074 25.948 38.172 -25.633 6.377 12.622 18.019 19.631 
Israel  12.508 19.194 27.402 -0.805 15.078 9.953 12.669 16.102 
Italy 44.485 47.605 52.969 28.688 38.332 40.227 42.99 44.45 
Japan 29.857 31.167 34.135 23.288 25.515 27.043 28.015 30.327 
Korea 17.993 20.992 22.571 17.287 18.493 18.51 18.594 19.967 
Luxembourg 28.902 35.76 43.133 2.717 13.315 17.621 22.984 27.41 
Mexico 13.525 18.961 21.877 13.525 18.961 16.601 16.762 16.601 
Netherlands 33.16 38.557 42.342 11.248 32.001 29.555 31.764 34.452 
New Zealand 13.112 16.388 22.376 -18.401 0.551 8.667 14.684 15.233 
Norway 34.257 37.573 43.192 21.891 31.344 31.965 33.828 34.988 
Poland 34.578 35.455 36.156 29.633 29.633 30.907 32.167 34.578 
Portugal 32.005 36.738 42.457 21.677 26.941 28.084 31.373 32.005 
Slovak 
Republic 36.871 39.628 41.581 24.456 25.837 30.386 33.559 36.594 
Slovenia 38.455 42.349 47.269 12.532 22.827 28.937 34.1 39.987 
Spain 37.024 41.401 43.589 29.904 35.44 36.944 37.917 38.028 
Sweden 40.733 42.844 50.687 32.776 37.539 37.104 38.817 41.082 
Switzerland 18.588 21.458 26.029 4.239 9.498 12.211 15.29 19.119 
Turkey 36.131 38.153 41.606 35.012 36.91 37.693 38.389 38.252 
United 
Kingdom 28.214 32.329 38.13 8.446 27.914 24.86 28.033 28.214 
United States 27.421 29.582 34.423 9.298 18.354 22.95 24.823 27.983 
OECD – 
Average 32.007 35.64 39.942 16.755 26.08 27.869 30.793 32.73 
Poland’s 
position – 
OECD 
countries (35) 
18 14 11 27 20 20 16 17 
Poland’s 
position – EU 
countries (21) 
6 3 1 15 9 9 6 6 
Source: OECD StatExtracts, Taxing Wages, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx, access on 5 April 2014. 
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3. Conclusions 
The comparative analysis of labour taxation in Poland and OECD 
member states leads to two main conclusions, and consequently permits making 
appropriate recommendations. 
Firstly, it would be difficult to unequivocally appraise the size of the tax 
wedge in Poland, as the appraisal depends on the benchmark. If the assumed 
benchmark is the average labour taxation in OECD countries, then the tax 
wedge is considerably higher in Poland. If, however, comparison is made 
among Poland and the EU member states, Poland’s tax wedge can be considered 
moderate. An obvious question which arises is whether labour taxation in 
Poland can be reduced. The question is justified in the current conditions of 
chronic and still high unemployment, with the low ability of the economy to 
create new jobs. Such a step seems to be desirable taking into account 
theoretical findings and economic practice in various countries. It appears, 
however, that it is not possible in the foreseeable future. A reduction in income 
taxes would disrupt the appropriate level of budget deficit and public debt, i.e. 
the nominal criteria necessary to be met by candidate countries to become 
members of the Economic and Monetary Union, of which Poland is one. In 
addition, cutting social security contributions is unrealistic in the light of the 
current and expected (considering the ageing of the society) deficit of the Social 
Insurance Fund. 
Secondly, a relatively low diversity of labour tax burdens of individuals 
in different household types was observed in Poland, which had also been noted 
in earlier studies (Krajewska 2007, pp. 192-193, Polarczyk 2007, p. 3). The 
problem, however, lies in the fact that the diversification did not show an 
upward trend in the study period, which contributed to preserving the unfavourable 
structure of taxation. Undoubtedly, labour taxation in Poland insufficiently takes 
into account the financial situation of low-earning individuals and, in particular, 
those with dependent children. That, on one hand, creates conditions for the 
impoverishment of some social groups and, on the other hand, stands in 
contradiction to the declarations to implement a pro-family policy. Such  
a system of labour taxation makes it more difficult to enter the labour market 
and remain employed, especially for young people and those characterised by 
low productivity (most commonly low-skilled workers). Therefore, a selective 
reduction in non-wage labour costs of those employee groups would be 
recommended. This could be carried out in at least three ways. The reduction 
may result, firstly, from subsidising their employment from public funds 
through employee benefits; secondly, from reducing social security contributions 
(apart from the “capital” contribution) and taxes paid on their earnings; and, 
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thirdly, by introducing tax allowances for those who employ them. In general, 
the aim would be to make the net earnings received by low-earning individuals 
sufficiently attractive and competitive as compared to income received from 
sources other than official (legal) employment, in other words to reduce all 
kinds of services or activities which take place in the so-called grey area. It 
would also be necessary to introduce family allowances within personal income 
tax or/and introduce special benefits for employees providing for children. The 
resulting short-term decline in the level of budget revenues would translate into 
increased public finance revenues over the long-term, after the labour market 
situation would have improved. 
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Streszczenie 
 
OPODATKOWANIA PRACY W POLSCE NA TLE  
POZOSTAŁYCH KRAJÓW OECD 
 
Celem opracowania jest identyfikacja wysokości i zróżnicowania opodatkowania 
pracy, wyrażanego poprzez tzw. klin podatkowy, w Polsce na tle krajów OECD. 
Identyfikacji tej dokonano na podstawie analizy danych statystycznych zgromadzonych  
w bazie OECD obejmujących lata 2000-2012. W opracowaniu dokonano interpretacji 
pojęć kluczowych, takich jak opodatkowanie pracy, klin podatkowy i pozapłacowe 
koszty pracy. W dalszej części syntetycznie omówiono ustalenia teoretyczne i wyniki 
badań empirycznych dotyczących skutków opodatkowania pracy dla funkcjonowania 
rynku pracy, a zwłaszcza jego wpływ na zatrudnienie i bezrobocie. Badania własne 
objęły analizę porównawczą wielkości klina podatkowego w różnych typach gospodarstw 
domowych w Polsce i pozostałych krajach OECD w latach 2000-2012. Najważniejszą 
konstatacją wynikającą z analiz jest, iż w Polsce opodatkowanie pracy w zbyt małym 
stopniu uwzględnia sytuację materialną osób nisko zarabiających oraz mających na 
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utrzymaniu dzieci. Wyniki przeprowadzonych badań stały się podstawą sformułowania 
wniosków syntetycznych i rekomendacji dla Polski. Zasugerowano w nich przede 
wszystkim, by rozważono selektywne obniżenie pozapłacowych kosztów pracy osób 
nisko zarabiających oraz obciążonych obowiązkami rodzinnymi.  
 
Słowa kluczowe: podatek, opodatkowanie pracy, pracodawca, pracownik, koszty pracy, 
wynagrodzenia 
 
 
 
